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"The punishment which the wise suffer who refuse to take part in government, is to live under the government of worse men" - Plato 427-347 BC |
| Pages 20-39 of Joseph Perez Testimony in Long Beach July 6, 1998 |
| As noted in Table 5, the number of pre-hearing remand cases has caused the backlog in the Branch of Hearings and Review to steadily increase to the point that it would have taken more than 16 person years to eliminate at the end of FY 1996. This backlog has materially lengthened the time it takes to have a hearing and receive a decision. When deserving injured employees are without benefits, justice delayed is justice denied. The FECA is remedial legislation and one of its major purposes is to prevent Federal employees, who are without income because of job-related injuries, from sinking into poverty. However, the combination of large numbers of improperly denied cases and delays in scheduling hearing has forced many injured employees into poverty which is directly contrary to the purpose of the Act. It is not unusual for an injured employee to wipe out his or her life savings, lose their house and be forced into bankruptcy because of lack of timely benefit payment. While cost savings and better service are complementary parts of the compensation covenant, Claimants are being cheated. Director DFEC Markey told me that 40% of Claimants whose benefits are terminated never respond. When I asked him to explain why this figure was so high he said "we just don't know." In light of a remand rate averaging 45% it would appear that DFEC should seek some answers. However, as shown by the thrust of the data and narrative presented in OWCP's Annual Reports, DFEC is not interested in those types of answers. DFEC is more interested in measuring its success by the amount of benefits reduced. Page 20
In addition, to deflect attention from its significant adjudication failures, DFEC has chosen to emphasize the timeliness of its decisions. Although DFEC attempts to equate "timely decision" with "correct decision" it is obvious that a correct decision, rendered outside of an arbitrary and capricious time standard, is preferable to an incorrect decision which is rendered within such a standard. In his September 30 written testimony, Acting Director, OWCP Hallmark stated "[a]n average of 92 percent of all traumatic injury claims are approved upon initial adjudication.' This is misleading. In fact, in October 1993, DFEC implemented new procedures for adjudicating minor, lost-time traumatic injury cases. This type of injury represents the vast majority of all traumatic injuries reported to DFEC.(61) The FY93 Report described these procedures as follows:
According to the FY93 Report, "during a pilot implementation of these procedures approximately 72% of all traumatic 'lost-time' cases created were processed without an initial claims examiner review. Of these cases, fewer than 14% were subsequently reopened for adjudication."(63) Furthermore, according to the data published in OWCP's FY96 Report, more than half of the traumatic injuries ___________________________________________________61 See FY92 Report at 7: cases created equals no lost time cases plus continuation of pay cases. 62 FY93 Report at 9 (emphasis added). 63 Id. Page 21
reported actually involved no lost time from work.(64) This means that the great majority of cases Acting Director Hallmark testified were "approved upon initial adjudication," involve minor or no lost time injuries. These cases are not reviewed by Claims Examiners and are not in fact "approved" in the normal understanding of that word, or the implication created by Acting Director Hallmark's testimony. When confronted with data showing a consistent remand rate of 45%, a senior OWCP official attempted to minimize the significance of this shortcoming by stating that the actual number of remanded cases is very small in comparison to the total number of injuries reported. This statement is reflective of the arrogance and insensitivity that permeates all of DFEC and OWCP. I am sure that the many employees whose decisions are remanded each year, after a lengthy delay, view the significance of their case differently. Furthermore, the number of cases remanded should be measured against the number of serious injuries reported in a year (10,000) rather than the total number of injuries reported in a year most of which are so minor that DFEC does not even devote staff resources to reviewing them. However, even the number of cases listed in OWCP`s Annual Reports report as remanded do not reflect the true extent of poor decisions. For example, because of delays in scheduling timely oral hearings, DFEC officials have encouraged Claimants to request a review of the written record in lieu of an oral hearing. According to data published in the FY96 Report,(65) there was an average of 427 requests for written record reviews each year from FY88 to FY91. However, as summarized in Table 6, from FY92 to FY96, the average had increased, by 52%, to 648. Applying the average remand rate(66) during this period (42%) to this figure means that the number of remands should be increased by 272 cases. ___________________________________________________64 Table A-2. Page 22
From FY92 to FY96 the number of hearing requests dismissed each year averaged 1,056 and the number of withdrawal/no-shows averaged 567 per year. These numbers are high, representing respectively approximately 15% and 8% of the average yearly hearing requests and 28% and 15% of the average annual merit decisions, for the same period. A hearing request may be dismissed if the injury or death occurred prior to July 3, 1996; if the request was not made within 30 days of issuance of the decision; or, if the decision of the District Office was not final. ___________________________________________________65 Id 66 DFEC has not reported the number of ROR cases remanded. However, it is assumed that thenumber of cases remanded for this category would emulate the number of hearing cases remanded. 67 Sum of categories does not equal Total Hearing Requests. The difference represents the annual disposition deficit identified in Table 5, supra. 68 Includes no-shows. Page 23
69 5 U.S.C. § 8124(b)(1). 70 20 C.F.R. § 10.131(a). 71 "The Secretary of Labor shaU determine and make findings of facts and make an award for or against the payment of compensation 5 U.S.C. § 8124(a). Page 24
Some of the withdrawal/no-shows represent injured employees who have become frustrated with the more than 8 month delay in the hearing process and have sought some other remedy, e.g., many Claimants apply for Office of Personnel Management disability retirement in order to have some income. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that a portion of the withdrawal/no-show cases would have gone to hearing and would have been remanded.(74) ___________________________________________________ Page 25
Director, DFEC Markey has stated that 40% of Claimant's whose benefits have been terminated do not respond. From FY93 to FY96 an average of 2,267 Claimants'had their benefits reduced or terminated each year.75 The average remand rate for this period was 42%. This means that, if every Claimant whose benefits were reduced or terminated exercised their appeal rights an average of 381 additional cases per year would have been remanded.76 This means that approximately 880 caseS77 should be added to the average number of cases remanded annually between FY92 to FY96, for a total of approximately 2,507. In his September 30 testimony Acting Director Hallmark stated that DFEC accepts an average of 92% of all traumatic injury cases and 67% of occupational disease cases. Applying these percents to the 1996 data reveals that 12,016 traumatic injury cases and 8,147 occupational disease cases were not approved, for a total of 20,163 disapproved cases.78 It would be more relevant to compare the 2,507 remanded cases to this figure. This means that the number of remanded cases represents approximately 12% of denied cases rather than 1% of the total number of cases created. While 12% may still appear insignificant to some Department of Labor officials, it is significant that these 2,507 individuals had their claims wrongfully denied and were without benefits for an extended period of time. ___________________________________________________75 See Table 2, supra. 76Forty percent of 2,267 equals 907 of which approximately 42% (381) would have been remanded. 77 Reviews of the written record (272); dismissed cases (148); withdrawal/no-shows (79); and, terminations (381). 78According to Table A-2 in the FY96 Report, 7,991 hearing requests were received in FY 1996 which is approximately 40% of the numberof cases denied. Page 26
Another way to evaluate the number of remanded cases would be to compare it to the total number of serious injuries reported in a given year. Acting Director, OWCP Hallmark testified that DFEC receives approximately 10,000 serious injuries per year. This number corresponds to the number of QCM cases identified in Table 3. A more accurate indicator of DFEC's success would be to monitor its handling of these cases. The number of remanded cases, derived above, is 24% of the total serious injuries handled by DFEC in FY96.(*79) The number of remanded cases, and the fact that the majority of remands occur prior to hearing, suggest that DFEC's procedures, designed for headlong adjudications, are flawed. Director, DFEC. Markey and Acting Director, OWCP Hallmark established and enforced arbitrary and capricious time standards on the District Offices. These time standards require a District Office Claims Examiner to render a decision on a claim within 45 days and to act on a proposal to terminate benefits at the end of 30 days. These time frames are too short and are too rigidly enforced to permit appropriate consideration of the merits of the claim. This has resulted in significant numbers of prematurely denied cases. ___________________________________________________*79 "Over 9,700 cases were referred to nurses under QCM procedures. Nearly 3,400 workers were referred for expert second opinion evaluations, and 1,079 were referred for vocational rehabilitation services.... Of QCM cases with outcomes in FY 1996, 73 percent were resolved within one year of the date disability began and 81 percent were resolved within two years." FY96 Report at 9 (emphasis added). In FY96 both the remand rate (43%) and the pre-hearing remand rate (55%) were the highest since QCM procedures were fully implemented in FY94. See Table 4,supra. Query: in light of these facts, what does the term "resolved' mean? Page 27
For example, after the initial review of a claim a Claims Examiner wild write to the injured employee and advise him or her of any evidence necessary to perfect the claim for compensation. The injured employee is typically given 30 days to respond. However, when the Claims Examiner drafts the deficiency letter it is not received the same day it is dated. The letter spends some time in the District Office waiting to be mailed. The letter also takes time to reach the Claimant by mail. Therefore, a Claimant actually receives the letter several days after it is dated. The Claimant then prepares a response which takes several days to reach the District Office. In fact, when a decision is rendered 30 days from the date of the letter, the Claimant has not received "at least 30 calendar days" to respond as required by the regulation.(*80) When the time standards require a decision, the Claims Examiner will deny the claim if the requested information has not been submitted. A Claimant may ask for a hearing to appeal the denial of the claim. In the period between the time the claim is denied and the time the case is transferred to the Branch of Hearings and Review, the requested evidence may come in. In some cases the information is in fact received by the District Office in time but is not put into the case file quick enough to prevent the denial. However, unless specifically asked to do so, the District Office will not reconsider the denial. It appears to be directly contrary to the purpose of the FECA to quickly deny benefits without at the same time trying to quickly consider the merits of the claim when the requested evidence is received. ___________________________________________________*80 The statute does not specify a 30 day period. This is purely discretionary on the part of DFEC. Furthermore, the relevant regulation does not mandate a 30 day period. In fact, the regulation states: "the Office will inform the Claimant of the defects in proof and grant at least 30 calendar days for the Claimant to submit the evidence." 20 C.F.R. § 10.110(b). Page 28
Similar problems plague decisions to terminate benefits. In Kendall v.Brock (*81) a district court granted preliminary injunctive relief to a Claimant whose benefits were terminated without a pretermination notice or an opportunity to respond. DFEC then promulgated FECA Bulletin 86-85. This Bulletin established new procedures for the termination or reduction of compensation benefits.(*82) The procedures require that a Claimant, whose benefits will be reduced or terminated, must be notified of the proposed action by letter. This letter informs the Claimant that he or she has the right to submit evidence and argument against the proposed action within 30 days.(*83) The procedures state that
However, this 30 day period is rigidly enforced. The procedures further state:
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As with the deficiency notice, the pre-termination notice is not released in a manner that will provide a Claimant with the full 30 days to respond. The procedures require a Claims Examiner to refer the case file, with the notice of proposed termination and a copy of the evidence which forms the basis for the proposal, to a Senior Claims Examiner for review and concurrence. If the Senior Claims Examiner agrees with the proposed termination "he or she will so indicate on the notice and release the letter advising the Claimant of the proposed termination or reduction"(*86) If there is any delay between the date the Claims Examiner prepares the notice of proposed termination and the date the Senior Claims Examiner releases it, the Claimant has less than 30 days to respond. Furthermore, the termination procedures do not allow time for the notice to reach the Claimant by mail and for the Claimant's response to be processed by the DFEC mail room. DFEC continually emphasizes its timely decision making.(*87) However, when nearly half of these so-called "timely decisions" are remanded when appealed, it is incredible that the OWCP Annual Reports to Congress, continually herald DFEC's success in making timely decisions. One important reason why decisions are reversed is that DFEC has taken a rigid and uncompromising position on extensions of the 30 period. Although Acting Director Hallmark's September 30 testimony stated that the 30 day period is "a time frame which for reasonable cause may be extended;" it is obvious that such extensions are not being granted since 55% of remanded cases are remanded priorto hearing. These pre-hearing remands occur when supporting evidence has been submitted after the "timely decision" but before a hearing. It appears that the rigid 30 day period is arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion.A more appropriate exercise of discretion would be to permit extensions of time, both to correct initial deficiencies and to respond to termination notices. Furthermore, these extensions should be granted routinely for the following reasons. ___________________________________________________*86 FECA PM ch. 2-1400.7b(l). *87 See e.g. "Prompt processing of claims is a primary goal for the FEC program since timely and accurate adjudication is the necessary first step to providing service." FY93 Report at 8. "The FEC program regularly meets high standards of timeliness in deciding and paying claims. For example, 94 percent of traumatic injury claims are decided within 45 days of receipt FY95 Report at 10. However, timely decision does not mean correct decision,
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Claimants Need More Time to Submit Required Evidence The rigidly enforced time standard are causing decisions to be made before the evidence necessary to render a correct decision can be submitted. As noted above, deficiency notices are not reaching Claimants in sufficient time so that they can make a timely response. Claimant also have insufficient time to response to termination notices as can been seen from the following illustration. A District Offices spends a considerable amount of time preparing evidence to be used to terminate or reduce benefits. For example, it takes more than 30 days for a District Office to schedule a second opinion (SECOP) medical examination. The examining physician then takes more than 30 days to submit a report, The Claims Examiner often requests a supplemental report from the SECOP which means another 30 or more days. Once the medical evidence is received it takes the Claims Examiner more time to evaluate the evidence together with the case record and prepare a proposal to terminate benefits. Page 31
During this whole period a Claimant is keep in the dark. However, when the proposal to terminate or reduce benefits is finally released, a Claimant is provided less than 30 days to assemble evidence to rebut the proposal. In many cases, a Claimant cannot even see a physician during this period, let alone have a medical report written and submitted. Since the opinion of the Claimant's treating physician is often discounted, a Claimant is at a further disadvantage since he or she must try to arrange an examination by a totally new physician. This imbalance is clearly not equitable and DFEC's rationale for its inequitable procedures is revealing. When confronted with the fact that Claimants are not receiving 30 days to correct deficiencies in their claims as required by the regulations, Director, DFEC Markey stated(*88) ___________________________________________________ *88 Although these comments relate to the 30 period to correct deficiencies in a claim, a similar rationale apparently underlies the rigid application of the 30 day period to respond to pretermination notices. *89 January 27, 1998, Memorandum from Director Markey addressing my November 19, 1997, proposal to reduce pre-hearing remands. Page 32
When numerous decisions are set aside because of evidence later submitted, Director Markey's characterization of requests for extension as "frivolous" appears baseless. Although the data supports the conclusion that these requests are not "frivolous" Director, DFEC Markey states that "the office's high standards for timely adjudication militate" against them. From this comment it appears that, in today's world of lowered expectations, it is more important for Director Markey that adjudication gets done at all, let alone done well. In light of the enormous remand rate, it is obvious that adjudications are not being done well. There is no doubt that a remand rate of 45% represents a significant DFEC Failure.(*90) Director, DFEC Markey also makes the following conclusory statement: "[i]t does not appear that the 30-day overall time frame for requesting and submitting information has been burdensome to Claimants." He does not provide any basis for this assertion. However, when 55% of remanded cases are remanded prior to hearing it means either that the initial "timely adjudication" was incorrect or that additional evidence has come in between the date of the decision and the date of the remand. This places Director Markey on the horns of a dilemma. if in fact Claimants are provided sufficient time to submit requested information, then 45% of these "timely adjudications" were incorrect when rendered. An amazing statistic. If, on the other hand, these "timely adjudications" are in fact rendered before the requested information can be submitted, then there is something fundamentally wrong with the arbitrary and capricious time standards. ___________________________________________________*90 Neither OWCP Annual Reports nor DFEC's Strategic Plan have identified strategies to correct this significant program failure. Page 33
Director, DFEC Markey's January 27 memorandum also acknowledges that the current system does not provide a Claimant with at least 30 days to respond as is required by the regulations. Incredibly, he then states: [t]he draft revision to OWCP's regulations addresses this point by stating that 'the Claimant will be allowed up to 30 calendar days to submit the evidence required."' Under the current regulations, Claimant's are granted a minimum of 30 days to submit evidence. Under the draft regulations, Claimant's are granted a maximum of 30 days.(*91) Perhaps I am misunderstanding, but how does granting Claimants less time, address the problem of insufficient time to submit evidence? The 30 day period appears to be DFEC's attempt to guarantee procedural due process. However, the 30 day period is not mandated by statute and, in light of the enormous remand rate, appears arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. It is clearly unfair and inequitable to allow a mechanical application of procedural due process to deprive injured employees of the more fundamental right to substantive due process (*92) Even though many incorrect decisions are set aside and the cases remanded to the District Office for remedial action, this is not an equitable result. While DFEC has not provided data on the length of time it takes to remand a case prior to hearing, it is reasonable to assume that it takes several months. In addition, Acting Director Hallmark has testified that it takes an average of 8 months to have a hearing and receive a decision. Of course deserving Claimants, who would otherwise be receiving benefits, are without benefits for this period, A more equitable way to address this problem would be to reengineer adjudication process to insure that decisions are correct when rendered and, of equal importance, to quickly revise incorrect or premature decisions. ___________________________________________________*91 Title 20 C.F.R. § 10.121 at 62 Fed. Reg. 67,143 (1997). The draft regulations also explicitly state that "OWCP will not grant any request for extension of this 30-day [pretermination notice] period." 62 Fed. Reg. 67,156. *92 '"The constitutional guarantee that no person shall arbitrarily deprived of his life, liberty or property; the essence of substantive due process is protection from arbitrary and unreasonable action." Black's Law Dictionary (5th Ed. 1979) at 1281 (emphasis added) Page 34
Claimants
Do Not Receive Timely Resolution of Section 8124(b)(1) of the FECA states that "[w]ithin 30 days after the hearing ends, the Secretary shall notify the Claimant in writing of his further decision and any modification of the award he may make and of the basis of his decision." The notice sent by Hearings and Review (H&R) to Claimants who request a hearing states: "[i]f you have requested an oral hearing, and it is determined that the case is in posture for such, you can expect the case to appear on a hearing docket in approximately six to eight months." Hearing Representative have 75 calendar days from the date of the hearing to release their decisions. Therefore, Claimants are not receiving notice of the results of the hearing within 30 days of the hearing.(*93) ___________________________________________________*93 The regulations define the termination of the hearing as "mailing a copy of the decision, setting forth the basis therefor, to the Claimant's last known address." 20 C.F.R. § 10.136. It does not appear equitable to broadly construe the time for termination of the hearing, and narrowly construe all other time periods against the Claimant. Page 35
As noted in Table 5 above, H&R has an enormous backlog of work, This backlog has materially contributed to the substantial delay in the hearings process. Pre-hearing remand cases represent a very significant source of this backlog. example, the data in Table 4 establishes that, from FY88 to FY96, pre-hearing remand cases represented, on average, 25% of H&R's annual merit decisions, and 2.6 person years of work. Similarly, as documented in Table 5, from FY92 to FY96, pre-hearing remands represented 12% of the total hearing requests received by H&R, and 82% of H&R's annual disposition deficit. In fact, since 1992 the accumulated backlog in H&R has swollen to more than 5,000 cases, representing over 16 person years of work. Pre-hearing remand cases have represented 82% of this cumulative backlog. Diverting scarce resources to this superfluous category of cases means that H&R cannot timely process cases truly needing an oral hearing. Pre-hearing remand cases are superfluous since they represent cases where the decision is so obviously flawed that no additional evidence is needed to reverse it. Pre-hearing cases also contain evidence submitted in response to a District Office request but which has not been processed. These facts are well known to Director, DFEC Markey and Deputy Director, OWCP Hallmark since they receive a steady stream of complaints from members of Congress and others. Although they are aware of the problems caused by premature denials, they have chosen to emphasize the timeliness of decisions at the expense of the quality of the decisions. While DFEC can truthfully say, in OWCP Annual Reports, that District Offices are rendering timely decisions, Director, DFEC Markey dishonestly conceals the fact that large numbers of these decisions are wrong. It is also easier for Director, DFEC Markey to minimize the enormous backlog in H&R since this is just one Office among many District Offices and since he can emphasize statistics showing that the District Offices are rendering timely decisions. - Nevertheless, the enormous backlog in H&R, swollen by premature and facially incorrect denials, has materially impeded the swift resolution of improperly denied claims, Page 36
Even when a Claimant receives a decision reinstating benefits, he or she is not made whole. Deprivation of benefits for the extended periods of time associated with delays in the hearing process can have catastrophic effects which cannot be remedied by the mere payment of compensation. It is not unusual for this improper deprivation of benefits to cause injured employees to lose all their resources and sink into poverty.
However it appears that the Federal Government is not a model employer and the agency responsible for insuring that Federal employees are treated in a fair and equitable manner has neglected its responsibility. Instead of a quick resolution, improperly denied cases often languish for more than a year, both in the District Office and the H&R, until a hearing is actually held and a decision rendered. Furthermore, in a significant number of cases, even though the flawed decision is set aside, the District Office will not reinstate benefits. While each District Office has a special unit to handle remanded cases, these Claims Examiners,will actually disregard the decision of the Hearing Representative and take steps to deny the case again. ___________________________________________________ Page 37
Claimants fair no better with the reconsideration process. A Claimant dissatisfied with a final decision may request a reconsideration.(*95) As with hearing requests, a Claimant will not be granted reconsideration if a final decision has not been released on the issue for which reconsideration is requested.(*96) Furthermore, unless the Claimant specifically asks for reconsideration, the District Office will not reconsider its decision, even if the Claimant submits evidence which would support the claim.(*97) It does not appear fair or equitable to require pro se Claimant's, many of whom are not skilled in the intricacies of DFEC's terminology, to invoke "magical words" in order to receive relief. In fact, as noted above, if a Claimant submits evidence in response to a deficiency notice and the evidence is received after the denial, a District Office will not reconsider the denial upon its own motion. This is plainly inconsistent with the purpose of the FECA and another example of how DFEC narrowly construes the Act against the equitable rights of Claimants. As with the hearing process, DFEC has erected procedural barriers which result in narrow technical decisions rather than an equitable review of the merits of the claim ___________________________________________________ *96 FECA PM ch. 2-1602.3a (1996).*97 See e.g. 20 C.F.R. § 10. 138(b)(1): "No formal application for review is required, but the Claimant must make a written request identifying the decision and the specific issue(s) within the decision which the Claimant wishes the Office to reconsider, and give the reasons why it should be changed." FECA PM ch. 2-1602.3a (1996): "If the contested decision or issue cannot be reasonably determined from the Claimant's request, the CE should return a copy of the application to the Claimant for clarification and take no further action on the request."Page 38
Furthermore, the reconsideration process is not timely. Although the Procedure Manual states: "[t]he goal for issuing reconsideration decisions is 90 days from receipt of the request." (98) this is not adhered to. In fact the process takes so long that the delay affects a Claimant's other appeal rights. The ECAB will accept appeals filed up to 1 year from the date of the last merit decision. If a reconsideration decision is delayed beyond one year, the Claimant's right to review of the original decision by the ECAB is abrogated. A program where many of its decisions are overturned when appealed, where there are significant delays is reversing improper decision and, as result, where there are significant delays in the payment of compensation, is not streamlined to provide customer service. DFEC Does Not Treat Claimants in a Fair and Equitable Manner As noted above, Congress has mandated "that injured or disabled employees of all covered departments and agencies, including those of the United States Postal Service, be treated in a fair and equitable manner." However, DFEC does not carry out this mandate, In an effort to mollify agency complaints regarding rising compensation costs, DFEC has implemented procedures, of questionable fairness, designed to reduce costs. This is plainly inconsistent with the workers' compensation covenant. It is also inconsistent with the purpose of the Act. Page 39
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